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Reverse Engineering, Unfair Competition,
and Fair Use
Leo J. Raskind*
INTRODUCTION
When Congress introduced the concept of "reverse engi-
neering" as a limitation on the rights of an owner of protected
industrial intellectual property in the Semiconductor Chip Pro-
tection Act of 19841 ("the Chip Act"), it effected an innovation
in the law of intellectual property that has ramifications wider
and deeper than the Chip Act itself. The statutory framework
of the reverse engineering provision is the capstone of the Chip
Act. As the principal statutory limitation on the mask work
owner's exclusive right to reproduce, it provides for legal sanc-
tions only when the competitive process, which includes copy-
ing in the traditional copyright sense, has failed to produce an
improved new product. The designation of reverse engineering
as noninfringing copying of protected chip products demon-
strates Congress's acceptance of the customary industry prac-
tice of substantial copying of a competitor's product in the
development of a new product.
The chip industry went through its formative stages when
there was neither patent nor copyright protection. Conse-
quently it developed a "free-wheeling" attitude toward competi-
* Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. I am pleased
to acknowledge the helpful comments of Michael J. Remington and Richard
H. Stern in the preparation of this Article.
1. 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (Supp. II 1984). Section 906(a), which permits re-
verse engineering, provides:
(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 905, it is not an in-
fringement of the exclusive rights of the owner of a mask work for -
(1) a person to reproduce the mask work solely for the purpose
of teaching, analyzing, or evaluating the concepts or techniques em-
bodied in the mask work or the circuitry, logic flow, or organization of
components used in the mask work; or
(2) a person who performs the analysis or evaluation described in
paragraph (1) to incorporate the results of such conduct in an original
mask work which is made to be distributed.
Id. § 906(a).
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tion.2 Rapid innovation and the large overhead costs of
developing new chip products coalesced in an awareness of a
common interest in the sharing of research and development
information. By 1978, when the specter of Japanese competi-
tion was perceived as a threat to their sales and market shares,
domestic firms sought congressional assistance in limiting copy-
ing of chip products by competitors.3 Initially, protection was
proposed within an amended Copyright Act; ultimately exten-
sions of copyright principles were rejected in favor of a sui
generis mode of protection. 4
Congress responded by invoking the misappropriation doc-
trine5 to draw the line between the permissible copying of a
chip within industry norms and impermissible chip piracy. It
wove the concept of the misappropriation doctrine, that a com-
petitor shall not reap that which it has not sown,6 into the stat-
utory elements of reverse engineering. Thus, the Chip Act
requires that the resultant second chip must meet the statutory
standard of an "original mask work,"'7 that the design of the
second chip must not be substantially identical to the first
chip,8 and that the design of the second chip must be supported
by a record of investment and toil.9 By using the misappropria-
tion doctrine, Congress placed a traditional doctrine of unfair
competition law in a new context. It placed a broad, equitable
2. E. ROGERS & J. LARSEN, SILICON VALLEY FEVER 93-95 (1984).
3. Copyright Protection for Imprinted Design Patterns on Semiconduc-
tor Chips: Hearings on H. 1007 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liber-
ties and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 31-33 (1979) (testimony of Andrew Grove, President, Intel
Corp.) [hereinafter cited as 1979 House Hearings]; M. BORRUS, J. MILL..EIN, &
J. ZYSMAN, U.S.-JAPANESE COMPETION IN THE SEMIcoNDuCTOR INDUSTRY 35-
39 (1982).
4. Samuelson, Creating a New Kind of Intellectual Property: Applying
the Lessons of the Chip Law to Computer Programs, 70 MINN. L. REV. 471, 481-
86 (1985); see also Barker, Copyright For Integrated Circuit Designs: Will the
1976 Act Protect Against Chip Pirates?, 24 S. TEx. L. J. 817, 842-45 (1983).
5. Misappropriation has become a catch-all term referring to the ob-
taining of an unfair competitive advantage by taking another's interest, such as
a physical asset, a trade secret, or business goodwill. See irLfra note 96 and ac-
companying text; see also Pocket Books, Inc. v. Dell Publishing Co., 49 Misc.
2d 252, 255, 267 N.Y.S.2d 269, 272 (1966).
6. See infra note 97 and accompanying text.
7. 17 U.S.C. § 902(b) (Supp. II 1984); see infra note 64 and accompanying
text.
8. 130 CONG. REC. S12,917 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1984) (Explanatory Memoran-
dum-Mathias-Leahy Amendment to S. 1201) [hereinafter cited as Mathias-
Leahy Explanatory Memorandum].
9. Id.
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principle astride a specific industry with distinctive practices
and unique products.'0 This is a marked innovation in the pro-
tection of commercial intellectual property, not previously
known in either copyright or patent protection." In thus de-
parting from the conventional formulation of unfair competi-
tion, which has been characterized as an amalgam of "judicial
conscience... [mixed] with an appreciation of good sportsman-
ship as well as a sense of justice,"' 2 Congress is likely to have
provided an innovation in the protection of commercial intellec-
tual property of significance and impact beyond the semicon-
ductor chip industry. Reverse engineering may well be
responsible for review and refinement of the doctrines of the
law of unfair competition, as well as of its kindred doctrine, fair
use in copyright law.
This Article traces the conceptual and legislative history of
reverse engineering and considers the impact of its probable in-
terpretation on the existing modes of protection for commercial
intellectual property. Part I describes the concept of reverse
engineering of the Chip Act and its origins. Part II explores
how courts are likely to interpret the concept. Part III explains
the relationship of the misappropriation doctrine to reverse en-
gineering and suggests an overall assessment of the significance
of the Act. The Article concludes that the misappropriation
10. The origin of this doctrine is the Supreme Court's opinion in Interna-
tional News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 237-44 (1918). See Abrams,
Copyright Misappropriation, and Preemption.: Constitutional and Statutory
Limits of State Law Protection, 1983 Sup. CT. REv. 509, 513. It is more precise
to characterize the reverse engineering provision as accepting Benjamin
Kaplan's presumption that copying is an integral step in advancing knowledge:
"[I]f man has any 'natural' rights, not the least must be a right to imitate his
fellows .... Education. . . proceeds from a kind of mimicry and 'progress'
depends on generous indulgence of copying." B. KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED
VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 2 (1966). Having accepted the validity of the need to copy
in the chip industry, Congress then invoked the misappropriation doctrine to
help draw the line between lawful copying and plagiarism.
11. When the affirmative defense of reverse engineering is raised in an in-
fringement action under the Chip Act, the court will have to fashion a novel
mode of analysis distinct from the traditional misappropriation doctrine, be-
cause, in this new formulation within the Chip Act, the traditional misappro-
priation concept of quasi-ownership rights of competitors is shifted. Reverse
engineering has become a concept which concedes at the outset that copying is
part of the accepted mode of competition in this industry. Applying misappro-
priation analysis as the conceptual foundation of reverse engineering now ar-
guably appears to require a calculus of such diverse factors as monetary costs,
creative effort, and pricing practices as part of a cause of action for
infringement.
12. Rogers, Unfair Competition, 17 MICH. L. REV. 490, 492 (1919).
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doctrine was originally significant as a conceptual framework
for the reverse engineering provision. It is, however, insuffi-
ciently precise to serve as a principle of interpretation. In an
assessment of the Chip Act, the Article questions whether the
Act seeks to protect products in terms of a technology that is
already obsolete.
I. REVERSE ENGINEERING UNDER THE CHIP ACT
The Chip Act marks a material innovation both in the law
of intellectual property and in the traditional doctrines of un-
fair competition. The copying and imitation that are permitted
under the Chip Act extend far beyond the boundaries of the
earlier doctrines of unfair competition and fair use. For the
first time in the law of intellectual property, the taking of vast
amounts of protected property is expressly sanctioned without
limitation as to the amount taken, the degree of similarity in
appearance of the second product, or the economic impact of
the competition on the revenue of the first owner. The Chip
Act is set apart from other laws of intellectual property by
Congress's invocation of the misappropriation doctrine as the
outer boundary of acceptable industry copying. Under the Chip
Act, some copying is a permissible mode of commercial conduct
between competitors, as long as the resulting product reflects
an acceptable level of investment and innovation by the copyist-
competitor. Reverse engineering validates customary research
and development practices in the semiconductor chip industry
by creating statutory "safe harbors" for copying of chips in cer-
tain situations. Under section 905 of the Act, an owner of a pro-
tected chip product is granted the exclusive rights of
reproduction, importation, and distribution therein. 13 Under
section 906, however, a manufacturer and distributor of a sub-
stantially similar chip, made by photographing and analyzing
the techniques of the protected chip, is immunized from liabil-
ity as an infringer, if the resultant second chip embodies an
original mask work within the standards of the Act, and the
requisite toil and investment can be proven. 14 Finally, the stat-
utory limitations on noninfringing reverse engineering are de-
scribed in the legislative history in terms of the
13. 17 U.S.C. § 905 (Supp. II 1984).
14. Section 906(a)(2) provides in part that "a person . .. [may analyze a
protected mask work and may incorporate the results] in an original mask
work which is made to be distributed." 17 U.S.C. § 906(a)(2) (Supp. II
1984)(emphasis added).
[Vol. 70:385
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misappropriation doctrine.15
Despite its formulation as a safe harbor of commercial ri-
valry, reverse engineering is properly part of the law of intel-
lectual property. Like the other doctrines of unfair
competition, the Chip Act requires a distinction to be made be-
tween legitimate competition and piracy.16 Moreover, because
of its reliance on the misappropriation doctrine, reverse engi-
neering incorporates by reference the baggage of the traditional
business torts17 that are lumped under the heading of unfair
competition. Finally, reverse engineering is also linked to un-
fair competition law by its procedural requirements. In both
unfair competition law and reverse engineering, one must allo-
cate the burden of proof and determine whether "public bene-
fit" is an element of the defense of reverse engineering.:' Yet
the reverse engineering provision of the Chip Act is also linked
functionally and historically to the copyright doctrine of fair
use.19 Just as fair use is a doctrine of limitation in the Copy-
right Act,20 so reverse engineering is a doctrine of limitation
within the Chip Act. In fact, the reverse engineering provision
of the Chip Act serves as the principal limitation on the exclu-
sive rights given an owner under section 905.21
15. See infra note 16.
16. See Stern, Determining Liability for Ikfringement of Mask Work
Rights Under the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act, 70 MINN. L. REV. 271,
336-39 (1985). Representative Don Edwards, in introducing H.R. 1028, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess., 129 CONG. REC. H643-44 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1983), referred to
the ability to "draw the line between legitimate reverse engineering and the
misappropriation forbidden by this bill." 129 CONG. REC. H645 (daily ed. Feb.
24, 1983). The Mathias-Leahy Explanatory Memorandum states that the pur-
pose of section § 906(a)(2) is "to allow protection of new mask works in the
creation of which their owners have expended substantial toil and invest-
ment." Mathias-Leahy Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 8, at S12,917.
The earlier Senate Report is in accord. There, section 906 is described as pro-
viding a line between "legitimate reverse engineering and the misappropria-
tion forbidden by this bill." S. REP. No. 425, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1984).
17. These torts include trademark infringement, trade libel, and interfer-
ence with contractual relations or prospective business advantage. See Tuttle
v. Buck, 107 Minn. 145, 151, 119 N.W. 946, 948 (1909) (listing prima facie busi-
ness torts).
18. See Stern & Hoffman, Public Injury and the Public Interest Secon-
dary Meaning In The Law of Unfair Competition, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 935, 966-
71 (1962) (deficiency of misappropriation doctrine is that it dictates the sacri-
fice of public interests to protect the assertion of private interests).
19. See infra notes 24-47 and accompanying text.
20. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982); see also infra note 26 and accompanying text.
21. See 17 U.S.C. § 906 (Supp. II 1984).
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II. INTERPRETING THE REVERSE ENGINEERING
PROVISION OF THE CHIP ACT
Speculation about how a court is likely, or ought, to inter-
pret the reverse engineering provision of the Chip Act begins
with the statute itself. Despite some similarity in format and
structure to the Copyright Act, it is clear from the definitional
section of the Chip Act that, for interpretation purposes, the
similarity between the two statutes is superficial.22 Section 901
of the Chip Act makes it clear that the exclusive focus of pro-
tection is the mask work, the source of the design of a semicon-
ductor chip product.23
A. COPYRIGHT AD COMPETITION
Like the owner of a work protected under the Copyright
Act,24 an owner of a mask work is also given exclusive rights.25
Similar to the Copyright Act, which places limitations on the
22. See infra text accompanying notes 24-35.
23. Section 901(a) provides as follows:
(1) a "semiconductor chip product" is the final or intermediate
form of any product-
(A) having two or more layers of metallic, insulating, or
semiconductor material, deposited or otherwise placed on, or
etched away or otherwise removed from, a piece of semiconductor
material in accordance with a predetermined pattern; and
(B) intended to perform electronic circuitry functions;
(2) a "mask work" is a series of related images, however fixed or
encoded -
(A) having or representing the predetermined, three-dimen-
sional pattern of metallic, insulating, or semiconductor material
present or removed from the layers of a semiconductor chip prod-
uct; and
(B) in which series the relation of the images to one another
is that each image has the pattern of the surface of one form of
the semiconductor chip product;
(3) a mask work is "fixed" in a semiconductor chip product when
its embodiment in the product is sufficiently permanent or stable to
permit the mask work to be perceived or reproduced from the prod-
uct for a period of more than transitory duration; ....
17 U.S.C. § 901(a)(1)-(3) (Supp. II 1984).
24. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982).
25. See 17 U.S.C. § 905 (Supp. II 1984). Section 901(a)(6) defines the
owner of a mask work as:
the person who created the mask work and is given the exclusive
rights to ... reproduce the mask work. .. ,to import or distribute a
semiconductor chip product in which the mask work is embodied, and
to induce... or... cause another person to ... [reproduce, import,
or distribute it].
Id. § 901(a)(6).
[Vol. 70:385
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exclusive rights of an owner,26 the Chip Act limits the exclu-
sive rights granted a mask work owner. Whereas the Copyright
Act qualifies its exclusive ownership rights principally in the
broad terms of its fair use provision,27 however, the Chip Act's
major limitation on the owner's exclusive rights is in the nar-
row confines of the reverse engineering provision. 28 Unlike the
fair use provision, which is couched in terms of specific, mainly
noncommercial uses and conditioned upon limited taking of
protected property,29 reverse engineering accepts copying as the
industry norm of competition. The industry spokespersons,
while seeking protection from piracy as they perceived it, wereinsistent on preserving and encouraging the industry practices
of creative copying, a practice known to them as reverse engi-
neering. Competition, as practiced in this industry, includes
studying the chip products of competitors as an acceptable
26. Section 107, the fair use provision of the Copyright Act, provides as
follows:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106 [17 U.S.C. 106], the fair
use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in cop-
ies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section,
for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (in-
cluding multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is
not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use
made of a work in any particular case is a fair use, the factors to be
considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation
to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
27. Section 107 of the Copyright Act codifies the judicially created doc-
trine of fair use as the principal limitation on ownership rights. Justice Story
is generally credited with fashioning the doctrine of fair use in Folsom v.
Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 343 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901); see also B. PATRY,
THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN COPYRIGHT LAW 361-65, 385-408 (1985); Raskind, A
Functional Interpretation of Fair Use, 31 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 601, 604 (1984);
Schulman, Fair Use and The Revision of the Copyright Ac 53 IowA L. REV.
832, 834-38 (1968); Yankwich, What Is Fair Use?, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 203, 212-15
(1954). The Copyright Act also contains other limitations, for example, special
reproduction rights for libraries and archives, 17 U.S.C. § 108 (1982), special
performance and display rights, id. § 110, secondary transmission rights, id.
§ 111, and others.
28. Under the Chip Act, there are two other limitations on the owner's
exclusive rights. Section 906(b) contains the first sale doctrine, 17 U.S.C.
§ 906(b) (Supp. II 1984); section 907 bars liability for innocent infringement.
Id. § 907.
29. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
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mode of rivalry in the marketplace.3 0 Therefore, a court is un-
likely to rely on copyright principles in interpreting the reverse
engineering provision of the Chip Act.
During the period in which reverse engineering emerged in
the legislative process as an independent provision, its marked
difference from fair use became clear. Initially, when the in-
dustry sought protection from the piracy of very successful
chips, it was by an amendment to the Copyright Act.31 Thus,
an infringement action under the Copyright Act could be met
by the fair use defense among others. The legal issue of apply-
ing the fair use doctrine of the Copyright Act to the practices of
the semiconductor chip industry became moot, however, as a
result of three sets of concerns. The first concern, one of the
Copyright Office, was that the Copyright Act did not extend to
mask works and chip products because they are utilitarian ob-
jects. 32 The second concern, that of various industry members,
30. An officer of a leading chip manufacturer stated in the Senate hearing
on the Chip Act that "there is a marked difference between fair reverse engi-
neering and... chip piracy ... ." The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of
1983: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 75 (1983) (state-
ment of F. Thomas Dunlap, Jr., Corporate Counsel and Secretary, Intel Corp.)
[hereinafter cited as 1983 Senate Hearings]. The difference was explained
more precisely by an intellectual property attorney as follows:
In both piracy and in reverse engineering, you take the chip apart,
you peel off the plastic, you photograph it, you etch away the layers in
order to take more photographs. But the question then is what do
you do with those photographs? ... The legitimate reverse engineer
... takes those photographs and... studies them and... takes the
concepts out of them, and he makes his own ... stencils or photo-
graphic plates with which to make chips.
The pirate just rephotographs those pictures, ... measuring
them and ... turn[ing] them into stencils. He does not make his own
stencils; he does not use [just] the ideas.
Id. at 84 (statement of Richard H. Stern).
31. Samuelson, supra note 4, at 476-78.
32. "The Copyright Office historically has refused, and presently does re-
fuse, to register claims to copyright in the design or layout of... and the...
chips themselves .... Courts have consistently refused to extend copyright
protection to useful articles as such." Copyright Protection for Semiconductor
Chips: Hearings on H.R 1028 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties,
and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 88 (1983) (statement of Dorothy Schrader, Associate Register
of Copyrights for Legal Affairs) [hereinafter cited as 1983 House Hearings];
see also id. at 11 (statement of Jon Baumgarten, Copyright Counsel for the As-
sociation of American Publishers, Inc.) (urging that the Committee approach
chip protection as a severable, unitary measure and not as a series of piece-
meal amendments to the basic Copyright Act).
In 1976, Intel Corporation, a leading manufacturer in the chip industry,
sought to deposit a chip as a copy of a mask work with the Copyright Office,
[Vol. 70:385
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was that protection under the Copyright Act would be ineffec-
tive because of the inadequacy of the fair use doctrine to accom-
modate the industry practice of reverse engineering.33 The
final concern about granting copyright protection to chip prod-
ucts came from a major constitutency of the Copyright Act, the
organized publishers. Unlike the members of the chip industry,
who were concerned that an extension of the fair use doctrine
would be insufficient, the publishers feared such extension as a
"distortion of the fair use doctrine to accomodate reverse engi-
neering."'34 Thus, when section 906 of the Chip Act emerged as
an independent provision, it was as a rejection of the fair use
principles of the Copyright Act.35
but the submission was refused. Subsequently, Intel brought an action against
the Register of Copyrights seeking to compel the acceptance of the mask work
by the Copyright Office. See Barker, supra note 4, at 842 (citing Intel Corp. v.
Ringer, No. C-77-2848-RHS (N.D. Cal. 1978)). After an unsatisfactory compro-
mise of that action, Representative Don Edwards introduced H.R. 1007, which
sought to amend the definitional section of the Copyright Act to cover mask
works and chip products. See H.R. 1007, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REC.
461 (1979). H.R. 1007 was not enacted.
33. One firm's representative stated that, "the twin goals of certainty and
encouragement of innovation can be achieved only if legitimate reverse engi-
neering is permitted. We feel that existing "fair use' provisions of Section 107
of the Copyright Law may not be suffwien however, as they tend to empha-
size non-commercial purposes." 1983 House Hearings, supra note 32, at 201
(statement of NEC Electronics U.S.A., Inc.) (emphasis added).
34. Id. at 12 (statement of Jon Baumgarten, Copyright Counsel for the As-
sociation of American Publishers, Inc.). Baumgarten explained his concern in
terms of publisher self-interest:
It must be emphasized that our concern is not born out of mere
desire for ideologically "pure" copyright law, nor ... aversion to in-
novative legislation. It lies, instead, with the blurring or distortion of
principles and the establishment of precedents that may have unto-
ward or unintended consequences for copyright protection of our
works, and those of other copyright proprietors.
Id. (emphasis added).
35. In a sentence that is likely to become famous, footnote 45 of the House
Report on H.R. 5525, the final House measure, states that "the provisions of
Section 107 do not apply to this Chapter, . . . and thus there is no right of fair
use under the Act." H.R. REP. No. 781, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 n.45, reprinted
in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5750, 5772 n.45 [hereinafter cited as
HOUSE REPORT]. (All citations to the House Report are to the star print.
United States Code Congressional and Administrative News contains the ini-
tial version of the House Report. The star print corrected typographical errors
in the initial version and contains three additional pages.). This footnote, how-
ever, cannot stand as the full statement of legislative intent because the mea-
sure as finally enacted differed by the addition of section 906(a)(2). Because
there was only an informal conference to reconcile the House and Senate ver-
sions of the Chip Act, the final piece of legislative history is not a conference
report but instead is the Mathias-Leahy Explanatory Memorandum. See Ma-
thias-Leahy Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 8, at S12,918. The Ma-
1985]
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Nonetheless, it is possible that some interpretations of the
Chip Act may allow a court to apply certain fair use principles.
Support for such application may be found in the initial version
of the House measure which did not include a separate reverse
engineering provision. The sponsors of the House bill, Repre-
sentatives Don Edwards and Norman Y. Mineta, stated that the
Chip Act would rely on the existing fair use provisions of the
Copyright Act.36 Similarly, the initial Senate bill3 7 was intro-
duced without a separate reverse engineering provision. The
Senate Report states that the original bill was amended in re-
sponse to the concerns described above to include a separate
provision legitimizing reverse engineering3s Subsequently, the
final House bill39 adopted the same reverse engineering provi-
sion.40 The text of the separate reverse engineering provision,
as incorporated in these measures, was taken from the state-
ment of Representative Edwards in his introduction to H.R.
1028.41 Like the first reverse engineering provision, it con-
thias-Leahy Explanatory Memorandum contains no reference to fair use, see
id. at S12,917-18, nor does the House counterpart, see 130 CONG. REC. E432-33
(daily ed. Oct. 10, 1984) (Explanatory Memorandum of the Senate Amendment
to H.R. 6163, Title III, as considered by the House of Representatives) [herein-
after cited as Kastenmeier Explanatory Memorandum].
One commentator has suggested that fair use principles might still be ap-
plicable to chip products eligible for protection under the Act in nonproduc-
tion situations. See Stern, supra note 16, at 339-42.
For a detailed chronology of the steps in the enactment of the Chip Act,
see Kastenmeier & Remington, The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of
1984: A Swamp Or Firm Ground?, 70 MINN. L. REV. 417, 424-30 (1985).
36. [T]he existing fair use provisions of section 107 of the present
Copyright Act apply to the exclusive rights of a chip innovator. Ac-
cordingly, in the case of masks and chips, it is not an infringement of
copyright to reproduce the pattern on the mask solely for the purpose
of teaching, analysis, or evaluation, or to use the concepts or tech-
niques embodied in the mask or chip, such as the circuit schematic or
organization of components. That means that legitimate reverse engi-
neering is not prohibited by the bill.
129 CONG. REC. H645 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1983) (statement of Rep. Edwards in-
troducing H.R. 1028 in the 98th Congress) (emphasis added).
37. S. 1201, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REc. S5837-38 (daily ed. May
16, 1984).
38. The inclusion of the express provision is described as follows: '"o re-
spond to these concerns [see supra text accompanying notes 32-34], the version
reported by the Subcommittee and the Committee includes an express provi-
sion guaranteeing the right to use a chip or mask for reverse engineering pur-
poses." S. REP. No. 425, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1984).
39. H.R. 5525, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. H5489-91 (daily ed.
June 11, 1984).
40. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 35, at 21 n.40, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 5770 n.40.
41. See supra text accompanying note 36.
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tained only the language that became section 906(a)(1) in the fi-
nal version as enacted.42 Although the reference in this section
to "teaching, analyzing, or evaluating" seems to reflect the ex-
ceptions of the fair use provision of the Copyright Act, 43 this in-
terpretation is likely foreclosed by section 906(a)(2).
In the end, in choosing how to interpret the reverse engi-
neering provision of the Chip Act, a court is likely to recognize
that the fair use doctrine is functionally inarticulate for the
protection of chip products. This is a reasonable finding be-
cause the Chip Act limits the scope of protection to mask works
and chip products.44 Narrowing the scope of protection to one
product strips the general categories of use and the conditions
of taking that are set out in section 107 of the Copyright Act
4 5
of functional significance. When chip products are the sole ob-
ject of protection, the method and practices of their production
and distribution are controlling. The traditional fair use con-
cern over the substantiality of the amount copied, for example,
has no application in the context of the established industry
practice of reverse engineering.
Since section 906(a)(2) of the Chip Act expressly permits
the complete reproduction of a protected mask work to be cop-
ied and incorporated into a second chip being marketed in com-
petition with the copied product, the limiting condition of
section 107(4) of the Copyright Act on "the effect of the use
upon the potential market"46 for the protected work has little
meaning. This is due to the Chip Act's acceptance of copying as
a necessary element of competition. The Copyright Act, by
comparison, does not directly address the competitive uses of
42. Section 906 (a)(1) provides as follows:
(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 905, it is not an in-
fringement of the exclusive rights of the owner of a mask work for-
(1) a person to reproduce the mask work solely for the purpose
of teaching, analyzing, or evaluating the concepts or techniques em-
bodied in the mask work or the circuitry, logic flow, or organization of
components used in the mask work ....
17 U.S.C. § 906 (a)(1) (Supp. II 1984).
43. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
44. The focus of the Chip Act is established by its definitional section, 17
U.S.C. § 901 (Supp II. 1984), and by section 902, id. § 902, in which the subject
matter of protection is limited to a single product, mask works fixed in semi-
conductor chip products. Section 906 (a)(2) provides that it is not an infringe-
ment of the exclusive rights of a mask work owner for "a person who
performs the analysis or evaluation described in paragraph (1) to incorporate
the results of such conduct in an original mask work which is made to be dis-
tributed." Id. § 906 (a)(2). For the text of section 906(a)(1), see supra note 42.
45. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
46. Id. § 107(4).
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protected property. Its fair use provision qualifies the exclusive
rights of reproduction primarily for noncommercial and non-
profit uses.4 7 The Chip Act's codification of the industry con-
ception of competition under the industry's terminology, i.e.
reverse engineering, is thus a marked departure from tradi-
tional copyright protection, requiring an equally new interpre-
tation by the judiciary.
B. REVERSE ENGINEERING AND CONSTRAINTS ON COMPETITION
By adopting the concept of reverse engineering instead of
the fair use provision of the copyright statute, Congress did not
prescribe uncontrolled competition in the production of chip
products. In section 906 itself, as well as in the legislative his-
tory, there are clear indications that Congress also attempted to
adopt the industry's distinction between "legitimate" reverse
engineering and "piracy." The House Report on the final
House measure,48 which was merged with the Senate bill49 in
informal conference, clearly acknowledges that reverse engi-
neering is an acceptable ingredient of effective competition and
product innovation.50 The Mathias-Leahy Explanatory Memo-
47. Section 107(1) of the Copyright Act states that one of the factors to be
considered in determining whether a use is a fair use is, "the purpose and
character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or
is for nonprofit educational purposes ... ." Id. § 107(1). The Supreme Court
has recently interpreted Section 107 as meaning that "every commercial use of
copyrighted material is presumptively an unfair exploitation... of the copy-
right." Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984); cf.
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 105 S. Ct. 2218, 2228-31
(1985) (doctrine of fair use will not be expanded to create what would amount
to a public figure exception to copyright).
48. H.R. 5525, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. H5489-91 (daily ed.
June 11, 1984).
49. S. 1201, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. S5837-38 (daily ed. May
16, 1984).
50. The House Report states:
Based on testimony of industry representatives that it is an estab-
lished industry practice to... make photo-reproductions of the mask
work in order to analyze the existing chip so as to design a second
chip with the same electrical and physical performance characteristics
as the existing chip (so-called "form, fit, and function" compatability),
and that this practice fosters fair competition and provides a fre-
quently needed "second source" for chip products, it is the intent of
the Committee to permit such reproduction by competitors . . . [and
to bar] mere wholesale appropriation of the work and investment in
the creation of the first chip.
It is the intent of the Committee to permi under the reverse en-
gineering limitation, the... creation of a second mask work whose
layou in substantial par is similar to the layout of the protected
mask work - if the second mask work was the product of substantial
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randum, the final piece of legislative history, similarly identi-
fies the intention to permit reverse engineering as understood
by the industry.5 1
Although the legislative history clearly states the intent of
both Houses to codify the practice of reverse engineering, the
reflection of that intent in statutory language is sparse. Section
906 bears the heading "reverse engineering."52 Section 906(a)
states that reproduction for the purposes stated in section
906(a)(1) is not an infringement of a mask work owner's exclu-
sive rights;5 3 section 906(a)(2) grants the competitor who has
performed the copying permitted by section 906(a)(1) the right
to incorporate the results of such conduct in a second chip.M
The only statutory language of constraint on copying in the en-
tire reverse engineering provision is in the phrase, "original
mask work," in section 906(a)(2). 55 That the legislative history
contains virtually all of the explanation of the distinction be-
tween "legitimate" reverse engineering and "piracy" reflects
the legislative decision to place the guidance for interpretation
of this distinction almost entirely in the legislative history,
rather than to undertake the monumental task of drafting a
statutory definition of fair competition. Thus, the Mathias-
Leahy Memorandum explains the meaning of an "original
study and analysis, and not the mere result of plagiarism accom-
plished without such study or analysis.
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 35, at 22, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
5771 (emphasis added).
51. The memorandum states:
Although the reverse engineering provisions of S. 1201 and H.R.
5525 were almost identical, this amendment includes a provision (sec-
tion 906(a)(2)) to clarify the intent of both chambers that competitors
are permitted not only to study protected mask works, but also to use
the results of that study to design, distribute, and import semiconduc-
tor chip products embodying their own original mask works. While
this intent appears indisputable from the legislative history in both
Houses, it seemg prudent to spell it out in the bill itself.
Mathias-Leahy Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 8, at S12,917 (emphasis
added). Representative Robert Kastenmeier introduced the Kastenmeier Ex-
planatory Memorandum, which essentially follows the format of the Mathias-
Leahy Memorandum, in the House. The Kastenmeier Memorandum notes the
significance of these memoranda. "[S]ince the House and Senate worked to-
gether and agreed in advance on the amendment to the semiconductor legisla-
tion [Section 906(a)(2)]. ... this memorandum coupled with the Senate's
document represent an informal 'conference report.'" Kastenmeier Explana-
tory Memorandum, supra note 35, at E432.
52. 17 U.S.C. § 906 (Supp. II 1984).
53. Id. § 906(a).
54. Id. § 906(a)(2).
55. Id.
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mask work" under section 906(a)(2) by contrasting it with a
"substantial copy." 6 The memorandum also identifies the
word, "original," in section 906(a)(2) as the final arbiter in that
section between permissible copying and actionable
infringement.5 7
C. PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS FOR REVERSE ENGINEERING
In distinguishing between legitimate reverse engineering
and chip piracy, the legislative history requires that a two-pron-
ged test be applied to the section 906(a)(1) copied mask work
when the results are incorporated in a section 906(a)(2) second
chip.58 The first part of the test requires that the resultant chip
be compared with the initial protected chip to determine
whether the second chip is "substantially similar" as opposed to
"substantially identical" to the first chip.5 9 If the second chip is
entirely or substantially identical, there is a conclusive pre-
sumption of infringement. When the comparison of the two
chips shades away from identity to similarity, the second prong
of the test comes into play. To establish noninfringing similar-
ity in these circumstances, it must be established by competent
documentary evidence that the copying competitor had ex-
pended substantial energy and resources in the development of
the second chip, in addition to copying some aspects of the
original.60
Because section 906 is an affirmative defense, a plaintiff al-
leging infringement may prevail by establishing that the resul-
tant second chip is identical or substantially identical to the
first chip. If, however, the comparison between the two chip
products reveals similarity, the defendant may prevail by sus-
taining the burdens of the risk of nonpersuasion and of going
forward with the production of probative evidence. For the de-
56. The Mathias-Leahy Explanatory Memorandum states:
The end product of the reverse engineering process is not an in-
fringement, and itself qualifies for protection under the Act, if it is an
original mask work as contrasted with a substantial copy. If the re-
sulting semiconductor chip product is not substantially identical to the
original, and its design involved significant toil and investment, so
that it is not mere plagiarism, it does not infringe the original chip,
even if the layout of the two chips is, in substantial part, similar.
Mathias-Leahy Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 8, at S12,917 (emphasis
added).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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fense of reverse engineering to be successful, a defendant must
dispel the conclusion of mere copying by showing business
records, time sheets of labor expended, actual designs, and
mask works produced that led to the similar design of the sec-
ond chip. The defendant will prevail if it makes this showing,
subject to establishing the final statutory requirement of pro-
ducing an "original mask work."'61
In addition, because section 906(a)(2) permits the person
who studies and analyzes an existing chip, as permitted by sec-
tion 906(a)(1), to incorporate those results into a second chip to
be distributed in competition with the first chip,62 the copyist
must also meet the statutory condition of producing a second
chip which is an "original mask work" within the meaning of
section 906(a)(2). Thus, according to the legislative history, the
affirmative defense of reverse engineering requires the defend-
ant to show substantial expenditures for labor and materials in
development and to establish that the resultant second chip is
"original" in the section 906(a)(2) sense.63
1. Interpretation of Originality Under Section 906(a)(2)
Because the word "original" appears in section 902(b) as
well as in section 906(a)(2), the question becomes whether the
word "original" in section 906(a)(2) has the same meaning as
the term in section 902(b), which provides that there cannot be
protection under the Chip Act for a mask work that "(1) is not
original; or (2) consists of designs that are staple, common-
place, or familiar in the semiconductor industry, or variations
of such designs, combined in a way that, considered as a whole,
is not original.''
Some of the uncertainty about the interpretation of "origi-
nal" in sections 902 and 906 may be attributed to the absence of
any reference to the term in the definitional section of the Chip
Act. However, H.R. 5525, the penultimate House measure,65
did provide the following definition in section 901(4): "a mask
work is 'original' if it is the independent creation of an author
who did not copy it from another source." Since this defini-
tion did not carry over into the final measure as enacted, it is
61. See Stern, supra note 16, at 333.
62. 17 U.S.C. § 906(a)(2) (Supp. II 1984).
63. Mathias-Leahy Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 8, at S12,917.
64. 17 U.S.C. § 902(b) (Supp. II 1984) (emphasis added).
65. H.R. 5525, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 130 CONG. REC. H5489-91 (daily ed.
June 11, 1984).
66. Id. § 901(4), 130 CONG. REC., at H5489.
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unclear whether the provision was deleted because this defini-
tion would have been inconsistent with section 906(a), or
whether it was deleted as surplusage, in light of section 902 as
enacted. There is no explanation in the legislative history for
the deletion of section 901(4).
The most likely explanation of the deletion of the House
bill's definition of "original" is its potential inconsistency with
the grant of the right to copy, subject to the conditions imposed
by section 906. The House Report on H.R. 5525 describes sec-
tion 901(4) as stating the "essence of the customary copyright
law concept of originality and [applying] it to mask works, to
the extent it is appropriate and feasible to do so."67 This refer-
ence is consistent with the intent to carry over the copyright
definition, but only to the extent congruent with the Chip Act.
Thus, it is likely that Congress intended the term "original" in
section 902(b)(1) of the Chip Act to incorporate the copyright
definition, and intended the addition of section 902(b)(2) to in-
corporate the Chip Act modification. Under section 902(b)(2),
therefore, a mask work is not original if it "consists of designs
that are staple, commonplace, or familiar in the semiconductor
industry, or variations of such designs, combined in a way that,
considered as a whole, is not original. ' 68 Further examination
of the legislative history of the Chip Act supports the notion
that section 902(b)(2) incorporates the copyright standard of
originality in semiconductor industry terms. This inference is
consistent with the statement in the Mathias-Leahy Explana-
tory Memorandum on the Chip Act. The section of the memo-
randum headed "Originality" states that "the purpose of section
902(b)(2) is to weed out mere insubstantial or trivial variations
on prior mask works and to allow the protection of new mask
works in the creation of which their owners have expended
substantial toil and investment ... ."69 Therefore, the designs
that are in the public domain of the semiconductor chip indus-
try at the time of the claim are ineligible for protection.
67. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 35, at 17, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws at 5766.
68. 17 U.S.C. § 902(b)(2) (Supp. II 1984). The phrase "as a whole" also ap-
pears in the patent statute. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1982). The purpose there is to
bar the dissection of an invention into its otherwise obvious parts. See id.
69. Mathias-Leahy Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 27, at S12,917.
The legislative history is not entirely dispositive on this point, however, be-
cause the traditional copyright standard of originality is extended in the con-
cluding phrases of that same paragraph by incorporating the reference usually
associated with the misappropriation doctrine, which in turn is said in other
parts of the legislative history to be the doctrinal basis of section 906.
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2. Originality Under Section 902(b)
This review of the history of the term "original" in section
902 of the Chip Act suggests that the standard of originality in
section 906(a)(2) is separate and distinct from that of section
902. Given its background, the term "original" in section
902(b)(1) is intended to perform the function of barring protec-
tion under the Chip Act for matter plagiarized from another in-
novation. This is the traditional copyright concern, assuring a
modicum of independent creation on the part of an author. A
work is original in the copyright sense if it contains a distin-
guishable variation from matter in the public domain and was
not produced by actual copying.70
Meeting the standard of originality in section 902(b)(2)
would not satisfy the originality requirement of section
906(a)(2) because each section requires a different order of
comparison. For example, the section 902 inquiry ordinarily
arises when one is seeking statutory protection prior to market-
ing. Absent any allegation of infringement at that time, the
profferred chip is compared with the existing state of the art in
the industry. Section 906, however, provides an affirmative de-
fense against an action for infringment. For section 906(a)(2)
purposes, originality is a standard of difference to be shown by
competent business records of toil and investment and by ex-
pert testimony. In the infringement situation, the comparison
is between the alleged infringing chip and the one from which
it was purportedly pirated.
3. Standard of Proof for Originality Under Section 906(a)(2)
There are further grounds for distinguishing the phrase, an
"original mask work" in section 906(a)(2) of the Chip Act from
the interpretation associated with section 902(b). In the latter
provision, "original" connotes independent creation and produc-
tion and implies the absence of producing the commonplace
and the familiar. This interpretation is not meaningful in sec-
tion 906(a)(2), which legitimizes reverse engineering and, there-
fore, accepts some copying as part of the creative process.
71
70. See Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1951); see
also E.H. Tate Co. v. Jiffy Enters., 16 F.R.D. 571, 573 (E.D. Pa. 1954) (holding
that simple, functional directions are not writings and therefore not entitled to
copyright protection).
71. Section 906 accepts copying in the sense associated with the copyright
standard. See Mathais-Leahy Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 27, at
S12,917.
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Hence, the interpretation of "original" in section 906(a)(2),
which is consistent with the whole of that provision as de-
scribed in the legislative history, requires a comparison of the
layout and design conduct of the plaintiff and the defendant.
More likely than not, for a defendant to prevail under section
906, its resultant "original mask work" under section 906(a)(2)
must be one that is functionally superior to the protected work,
as measured by the relevant technological criteria.72 At least
this is the standard to which Congress aspired. Whether courts
will apply this standard, however, remains to be seen.
The legislative history reflects the extensive testimony of
industry representatives who described the process of improve-
ment through reverse engineering. It is apparent that legiti-
mate reverse engineering is an industry custom in which the
duplication of a successful chip is the first step in reviewing and
improving the process of producing a better resultant chip. De-
creasing the size of a chip, improving its thermal stability, and
reducing the number of mask and wafer fabrication steps are
some of the current objectives of reverse engineering.73
The legislative history makes clear that an original mask
work within the meaning of section 906(a)(2) cannot infringe a
protected work. The requirement of originality in section
906(a)(2) is, according to the legislative history, to be met by a
showing of nonsimilarity, corroborated by the objective evi-
dence of toil and investment;74 the proof of improvement,
therefore, becomes the ultimate issue in establishing the de-
fense of reverse engineering.
D. INNOCENT INFRINGEMENT
The extent to which the Chip Act is grounded in validating
copying as an integral part of product innovation is underscored
by the innocent infringement provision.7 5 This section provides
that there is no liability for infringement if a purchaser imports
72. The legislative history supports this interpretation. The Senate Re-
port characterizes reverse engineering as spurring "innovation and technologi-
cal progress, as competitors seek to develop ever faster or more efficient chips
to perform similar or related functions." S. REP. No. 425, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
21 (1984).
73. The House Report mentions one form of product improvement as us-
ing less "silicon real estate." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 35, at 12, 1984 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5761. This is a reference to developing a smaller
chip by using more compact circuits and thus using less silicon.
74. See supra note 56.
75. See 17 U.S.C. § 907 (Supp. II 1984).
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or distributes an infringing chip product without notice of pro-
tection.76 An innocent purchaser is then liable for a reasonable
royalty while disposing of his infringing inventory, after having
notice of protection.
The legislative history makes clear that investment in new
products using chips, i.e., computers, recorders, etc., is the basis
of this favored treatment of an infringing use.7 7 The Mathias-
Leahy Explanatory Memorandum further emphasizes the lim-
ited scope of protection under the Chip Act and the great
weight which is accorded the development of competing prod-
ucts using chips. The memorandum, in characterizing section
907, states that "[ilt should be understood that . . .the first
payment of a reasonable royalty under Section 907 liberates the
semiconductor chip product unit from the intellectual property
monopoly, for the benefit of all downstream purchasers
"378
III. MISAPPROPRIATION AND SECTION 906
By providing a statutory framework that favors product in-
novation through competition, Congress has imposed on courts
presented with infringment actions under the Chip Act a duty
to fashion a new analysis. Sui generis protection for chip prod-
ucts requires striking a balance between exclusive ownership
rights and the particular mode of competition in this industry-
reverse engineering. Within the reverse engineering provision,
a court is required to distinguish "legitimate" copying by a com-
petitor from "piracy." To accomplish these tasks, Congress has
provided only a context in the Chip Act, rather than specific
statutory standards.79 The analysis required to make the statu-
tory distinctions is to be derived, as the legislative history indi-
76. Id.
77. The Senate Report states:
[E]ven after an innocent purchaser acquires notice of . .. infringe-
ment, the innocent purchaser's subsequent conduct may also deserve
a privileged status. If the innocent purchaser had already committed
substantial funds to the development of a product built around the in-
fringing chip before learning of the... [claim of protection], to com-
pel the innocent purchaser to abandon manufacture . .. could work
an undue hardship. S. REP. No. 425, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1984).
78. Mathias-Leahy Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 8, at S12,917.
79. For a recognition of the significance of the context in the interpreta-
tion of legal concepts in another area of the law, see Vincent-Daviss, Human
Rights Law: A Research Guide to the Literature-Part 1, 14 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L.
& Po. 209, 213-14 (1980).
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cates,80 largely from the misappropriation doctrine.
A. THE MISAPPROPRIATION DOCTRINE AND SECTION 906
The doctrine of misappropriation was not the first choice of
protection for chip products. Initially, protection was conceived
in terms of extending traditional copyright principles.81 The
testimony of various industry representatives at the hearings
developed an appreciation among the legislators of the impor-
tance of reverse engineering to the semiconductor industry,
sharpening the perception that the copyright doctrine of fair
use would be unable to accommodate reverse engineering.82
The rejection of copyright principles, including fair use, as a
framework of protection left a void for the legislators. Without
an organizing principle, the practice of reverse engineering-
the centerpiece of industry concern-would be vulnerable to at-
tack as infringement.
In the course of the hearings, two factors coalesced in mak-
ing the misappropriation doctrine the foundation of section
906. First came the suggestions in the course of the hearings
that the misappropriation doctrine could be adapted to distin-
guish chip piracy from innovative copying, consistent with in-
dustry standards. The earliest reference to misappropriation
analysis appears to have been made by Richard H. Stern, 3 who,
after noting the high, front-end costs of chip product manufac-
turing, stated that "it is unfair ... for the second comer to help
himself to the product of the first comer's labor and invest-
ment. '8 4 Professor L. Ray Patterson appears to have made an
early express reference to the misappropriation doctrine in the
hearings, urging sui generis protection as a form of "statutory
80. See infra notes 87-95 and accompanying text.
81. Samuelson, supra note 4, at 476-78.
82. See supra note 33 and accompanying text; see also 1983 Senate Hear-
ings, supra note 30, at 100-01 (statement of A.G.W. Biddle, President, Com-
puter and Communications Industry Association); id. at 102 (statement of
Ronald Potenski, Associate General Counsel, Association of Data Processing
Service Organizations); id. at 103 (statement of Jon Baumgarten, Copyright
Counsel, Association of American Publishers, Inc.); id. at 114-15 (statement of
Robert Hinckley, General Counsel, NEC Electronics U.S.A., Inc.).
83. Mr. Stern practices in the area of computer-related law in Washing-
ton, D.C..
84. Copyright and Technological Change: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 136-37 (1983) (statement of Rich-
ard H. Stern) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings on Copyright and Techno-
logical Change].
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unfair competition based on the misappropriation rationale."' 5
The second factor that led to the acceptance of the misap-
propriation doctrine was its ready compatability with the stated
needs of the industry. The several descriptions of the practice
of reverse engineering that emerged from the hearings served
to emphasize the transparent nature of the practice. Several
witnesses commented on the relative ease with which knowl-
edgable persons could distinguish legitimate reverse engineer-
ing from piracy.8 6 The legislative history is unequivocal in the
acceptance of the premise that courts will not face an especially
difficult task in distinguishing chip piracy from reverse engi-
neering. Thus, the Senate Report states "cases will rarely arise
that are in a gray zone between clear copying and clearly legiti-
mate reverse engineering, since most actual fact situations in
this field are either at one end or the other of the spectrum."8 7
The Mathias-Leahy Explanatory Memorandum echoes this per-
ception of the limited scope of the judicial inquiry in a section
906 case. As the memorandum states, "the courts are not
likely, as a practical matter, to find it unduly difficult to draw
the line between reverse engineering and infringement .... *"88
This statement is more likely a reflection of congressional ac-
ceptance of industry assurances than an accurate prediction of
judicial responses. Therefore, it remains to be seen whether
the courts will share this optimistic view of Chip Act infringe-
ment cases.
Congress agreed with the industry characterization of re-
verse engineering as a practice that would produce its own evi-
dence, or lack thereof, of wrongdoing. The idea that legitimate
reverse engineering would leave a "paper trail" of probative ev-
idence of conduct within acceptable industry norms captivated
the legislators.8 9 The Senate Report also reflects the complete
acceptance of the belief that reverse engineering as practiced by
the industry would provide the evidentiary basis for identifying
85. House Hearings on Copyright and Technological Change, supra note
84, at 56 (statement of Professor L. Ray Patterson).
86. 1983 Senate Hearings, supra note 30, at 146 (statement of Leslie L.
Vadaz, Senior Vice President, Intel Corp.).
87. S. REP. No. 425, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1984).
88. Mathias-Leahy Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 8, at S12,917.
89. The House Report states: "A number of witnesses testified as to the
practice... of reverse engineering.., and how to distinguish between chip
piracy and legitimate reverse engineering. They emphasized the evidentiary
importance of the 'paper trail' of legitimate reverse engineering that helps to
distinguish it from mere piracy." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 35, at 21, 1984
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 5770.
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chip product piracy. The Report states that "reverse engineer-
ing leaves a 'paper trail' not found in the files of pirates
. "... 90 The Senate Report gives special emphasis to its ac-
ceptance of the usefulness of reverse engineering as providing a
bright evidentiary line between permissible copying and piracy,
by commenting on the above statement as follows: "The Com-
mittee agrees with and adopts that view as a guide to its in-
tent."91 The final piece of legislative history, the Mathias-
Leahy Explanatory Memorandum, makes complete the legisla-
tive reliance upon the "paper trail" of reverse engineering.
92
The legislative history is equally clear that the misappro-
priation doctrine is the legal principle which codifies the prac-
tice of reverse engineering in section 906 of the Chip Act.
93
The pervasive characterization in the hearings of reverse engi-
neering as a settled industry practice tended to diminish the
stated reliance of Congress on the underlying rationale. Yet,
the misappropriation doctrine is clearly linked to section 906.
The Senate Report refers to this section as drawing the line
"between legitimate reverse engineering and the misappropria-
tion forbidden by this bill." The Mathias-Leahy Explanatory
Memorandum makes no express reference to the misappropria-
tion doctrine, but refers instead to the dictum associated with it
by noting that a copied chip "does not infringe the original
chip" if "its design involved significant toil and investment, so
that it is not mere plagiarism."95
This formulation of the misappropriation doctrine is drawn
from Justice Pitney's famous dictum in International News Ser-
90. S. REP. No. 425, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1984); see also Note, Semicon-
ductor Chip Protection: Changing Roles for Copyright and Competition, 71
VA. L. REV. 249, 258 (1985).
91. S. REP. No. 425, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1984).
92. The memorandum states:
As noted in the Senate Report, the courts are not likely, as a practical
matter, to find it unduly difficult to draw the line between reverse en-
gineering and infringement because the additional work required to
come within the privilege established by section 906(a) will ordinarily
leave a "paper trail."
Mathias-Leahy Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 8, at S12,917.
93. See infra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
94. S. REP. No. 425, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1984). The term "misappro-
priation" is used generically in intellectual property law, including the law of
trade secrets, to mean the taking and using of another's property for the sole
purpose of capitalizing unfairly on the goodwill and reputation of the property
owner. See supra note 5.
95. Mathias-Leahy Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 8, at S12,917.
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vice v. Associated Press.6 There, International News Service, a
news service unable to send cable reports from England to the
United States during the World War One, took the news re-
ports of its competitor, the Associated Press, from the Associ-
ated Press's early East Coast editions in the United States and
used those news stories as its own in its West Coast newspa-
pers. Justice Pitney, writing for the majority, found that Inter-
national News Service had engaged in unfair competition by
"taking material that has been acquired by [a competitor] as the
result of organization and the expenditure of labor, skill, and
money, and which is salable for money, and that [the copying
competitor] in appropriating it and selling it as his own is en-
deavoring to reap where it has not sown .... ,'97 This case
therefore treated the misappropriation doctrine as a cost-based
rationale for barring unfair competitive practices.
B. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MISAPPROPRIATION DOCTRINE
FOR SECTION 906
If the misappropriation doctrine is the conceptual basis of
section 906, it is necessary to assess the scope and content of
that doctrine in order to speculate about its impact on shaping
the interpretation of that provision. A review of the origin and
application of the misappropriation doctrine suggests that the
immediate significance for a court faced with the interpretation
of the affirmative defense of section 906 will be minimal.98 The
principal reason for the relative insignificance of the misappro-
96. 248 U.S. 215 (1918). One commentator notes: "The misappropriation
doctrine was first developed in International News Service v. Associated Press
by the Supreme Court." Baird, Common Law Intellectual Property and the
Legacy of International News Service v. Associated Press, 50 U. CHI. L. REv.
411, 412 (1983).
97. 248 U.S. at 239-40.
98. The immediate, or short-run, impact might be distinguished from the
longer-term significance of the misappropriation doctrine. The enactment of
the Chip Act occurred at a time when industry representatives were in agree-
ment on the need for and the manner of protection. That is, the industry at
the time the Act was developed had a given structure. The number of firms in
the industry and the leadership position of the firms with large market shares
were fixed in relation to the smaller firms in the semiconductor chip industry.
See M. Borrus, Reversing Attrition: A Strategic Response to the Erosion of
U.S. Leadership in Microelectronics (1985) (Working Paper, Berkeley Round-
table on the International Economy).
If the structure of the industry should change, so that the behavior of the
firms in relation to each other changes, say within the next five years, then
the practice of reverse engineering and the meaning of misappropriation might
also be altered. For further discussion of this issue, see infra notes 112-128
and accompanying text.
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priation doctrine in the interpretation of section 906 is that it is
"a somewhat hazily defined business tort."99 Its vagueness lim-
its its usefulness. From its initial formulation, the misappropri-
ation doctrine has been a legal principle of uncertain content.
In his vigorous dissent in the International News Service case,
Justice Brandeis considered the doctrine inconsistent with the
concept of lawful, commercial competition. He stated:
competition is not unfair in a legal sense, merely because the profits
gained are unearned, even if made at the expense of a rival.. . . He
who follows the pioneer into a new marke4 or who engages in the
manufacture of an article newly introduced by another, seeks profits
due largely to the labor and expense of the first adventurer; but the
law sanctions, indeed encourages the pursuit'o°
In light of Justice Brandeis's characterization of lawful compe-
tition, it is ironic that Congress invoked the misappropriation
doctrine to articulate the concept of reverse engineering in the
semiconductor chip industry.
Another factor responsible for limiting the significance of
the misappropriation doctrine is the restrictive reading of the
misappropriation doctrine imposed by courts in subsequent
cases. The Supreme Court itself has cast doubt upon the use-
fulness of the doctrine. In companion cases examining the ex-
tent to which state unfair competition statutes could impose
liability for copying an article unprotected either by federal
patent or copyright laws, the Supreme Court held that federal
law necessarily preempted state unfair competition laws. 0 -1 In
expressing the clear federal policy favoring competition in
terms of the broad language of preemption, the Court undercut
the very basis of the misappropriation doctrine of the Interna-
tional News Service opinion.10 2
99. Abrams, supra note 10, at 513; see also Stern & Hoffman, supra note
18, at 969.
100. International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 259 (1918)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
101. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 228-31 (1964);
Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237-38 (1964). The ex-
tent of the implied limitation imposed by these cases on the International
News Service case remains uncertain, because of subsequent Supreme Court
opinions giving some scope to state trade secret and record piracy statutes. See
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 478-79 (1974); Goldstein v. Cali-
fornia, 412 U.S. 546, 552-58 (1973).
102. Some courts view Stiffel and Compco as having implicitly overruled
International News Service. See Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. DeCosta, 377
F.2d 315, 318-19 (1st Cir.), cert denied, 389 U.S. 1007 (1967). Judge Learned
Hand declined to extend the International News Service doctrine to bar copy-
ing of an unprotected dress design by a competitor in Cheney Bros. v. Doris
Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279, 280 (2d Cir. 1929). Judge Hand's treatment of the mis-
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Finally, the misappropriation doctrine has been criticized
as a legal principle in search of a rationale.103 This viewpoint
finds the doctrine suspect because it cannot be reconciled with
the concept of competition. The doctrine fails to articulate the
interest or interests which it seeks to protect, and absent such
statement and analysis, it has no predictive content. It remains
a vague "theory of unfair competition law.., a carte blanche
to the courts to write their own code of business morality."' 4
Given these criticisms of the misappropriation doctrine, it
is unlikely to serve the analytical function which its proponents
ascribed to it during the legislative process. A court faced with
an infringement action under the Chip Act would not find
helpful a doctrine circumscribed in case law and criticized in
the literature.
C. INTERPRETING SECTION 906
The relative clarity and precision of the industry descrip-
tion of the "paper trail" of legitimate reverse engineering will
ultimately preempt the application of the misappropriation doc-
trine. A court could properly find an identifiable standard of
acceptable commercial copying of semiconductor chip products
by reference to the exposition of legitimate reverse engineering
in the hearings.
The exposition of the "paper trail" associated with "legiti-
mate" reverse engineering could satisfy the test required by
section 906. For example, the initial issue of determining
whether the allegedly infringing chip is itself an original mask
work would invoke the standard of "substantial similarity."'10 5
Surely a court would permit expert testimony to illuminate this
issue. At that point, the court would review the complete his-
tory of the design of the allegedly infringing chip. Moreover,
the very evidence which an expert might rely upon to give an
opinion as to the similarity or lack thereof would also be rele-
vant and probative of "legitimate" toil and investment. The
many schematic and layout diagrams in which transistors are
connected to perform specific electronic functions, and the com-
puter simulations of their operations, are the basis of the design
appropriation doctrine is analyzed in Goldstein, Federal System Ordering of
the Copyright Interes4 69 COLUM. L. REv. 49, 51-62 (1969). Judge Hand wrote
privately that the misappropriation doctrine and its broad grant of quasi-prop-
erty rights were mistaken. See Baird, supra note 96, at 419.
103. Stern & Hoffman, supra note 18, at 966-71.
104. Id. at 969.
105. See supra text accompanying notes 64-74.
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process. They would serve both to illustrate the differences be-
tween the earlier and later chips, and to reflect the cost of the
layout designer's time.' °6
Given the weight accorded the "paper trail" in the legisla-
tive history and the clarity of the description of the present
technology which produces it, a court could resolve the in-
fringement issue without further analysis. The broad formula-
tion of the misappropriation doctrine would add little to the
precise specification of costs, including investigative marketing
expenses, which the reverse engineering "paper trail"
identifies.
A derivative benefit of the reverse engineering model is
the clarity and precision with which the design process was de-
scribed in cost terms. Witnesses reiterated the high costs of the
design process. From the initial marketing survey defining a
marketable product to the conclusion of the engineering and
layout design phases, millions of dollars are expended.10 7 One
witness estimated a front-end development cost of $50 million
to design and develop a new semiconductor chip product.108
Another witness estimated a $40 million cost of developing and
marketing a sophisticated chip, which could be copied at a cost
of $6 0,000.1 9 The House Report stated that "development costs
for a single new chip can reach $100 million."110 While the
106. Layout designers were described in the 1979 hearings as "[c]reative
persons and not just draftsman .... Layout design is a skill that has success-
fully resisted. . . attempts at computerization, it requires a level of human in-
genuity that will not be computerized... ." 1979 House Hearings, supra note
3, at 26 (testimony of L.J. Sevin, President, Mostek Corp.).
Since the hearings, software improvements have permitted complete cus-
tomization of chips entirely by computers. This change reflects the rapidity of
technological change and the resultant pressure on the Chip Act, e.g., is a chip
customized by a computer program an "original" under section 902(b)?
107. 1983 House Hearings, supra note 32, at 205, 209-11 (testimony of Chris-
topher K. Layton, Vice-President, Intersil, Inc.). Layton stated that the design
of a new chip required a period of two or three months of marketing studies
by two persons at a cost of $50,000. The subsequent engineering effort of two
man-years would involve a cost of about $200,000. Another year would be re-
quired for the layout design to be prepared at a cost of some $75,000. To trans-
late the composite drawing into interactive graphics would require an added
investment of $1 million. The copier, however, could replicate the originator's
chip in three to six months with an investment of $30,000 to $50,000. Id.
108. House Hearings on Copyright and Technological Change, supra note
84, at 129, 135 (statement of Richard H. Stern).
109. Cohodas, Special Report. Technology and the Law-New Technology
Puts Strain on Old Laws, 42 CONG. Q. 135, 135 (1984), reprinted in House
Hearings on Copyright and Technological Change, supra note 84, at 355.
110. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 35, at 2, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 5751.
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originating firm might take years to complete its work, the
House Report notes that a competitor could copy the original
chip in only a few months at a meager cost of $50,000."1
With a legislative history replete with the explicit details of
development and marketing for this industry, including the rel-
ative magnitudes of the costs of the originator as distinguished
from the copier, it is most likely that infringement actions
would be resolved around the reverse engineering model.
Courts would be required only to assess the credibility and pro-
bative weight to be accorded the business records of the com-
petitors. To accomplish this task, courts would rely on the
testimony of experts.
D. THE DEMISE OF THE MISAPPROPRIATION DOCTRINE
The full effect of the misappropriation doctrine was ex-
hausted in the legislative process. There is a certain irony in
the demise of the misappropriation doctrine as a viable doctrine
under the Chip Act. In the formative stages of the designing of
statutory protection for semiconductor chip products, the mis-
appropriation doctrine was the conceptual catalyst of sui
generis protection. That doctrine, as a branch of unfair compe-
tition law, energized the customary industry practice of reverse
engineering into a legal standard expressed in the text of sec-
tion 906.112 As it turned out, the nature and description of the
underlying customary practice will better serve courts as a nor-
mative standard of permissible competition than would the mis-
appropriation doctrine. It is more likely that judicial opinions
in Chip Act infringement actions will be expressed in terms of
industry norms and costs than in the agrarian metaphor associ-
ated with the misappropriation doctrine." 3 The ultimate con-
clusion of law will probably be stated as either legitimate
reverse engineering or improper piracy. The distinction be-
tween the two is likely to be illuminated by the "paper trail" of
reverse engineering.
CONCLUSION
As an innovative statute providing protection for commer-
cial intellectual property of a single industry, the Chip Act will
continue to be an object of study and analysis. It is appropriate
111. Id-
112. See 17 U.S.C. § 906 (Supp. II 1984).
113. See supra text accompanying note 97.
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to conclude this review of the development and interpretation
of this statute by speculating about its long-range significance.
Recent studies of this colorful industry portray the enormous
dynamism of its technology and the vulnerability of its firms to
these changes.114
Viewing the Chip Act as legislation sought by this industry
of fewer than thirty major domestic producers suggests doubts
as to its durability.115 Throughout its history, intellectual prop-
erty law has demonstrated only a limited capability to accomo-
date to new technology. Computer programs remained an
uncertain subject matter of copyright protection for four years
after the 1976 Copyright Act revision.116 The complete absence
of copyright protection for semiconductor chip products ulti-
mately generated the quest for protection which culminated in
the passage of the Chip Act. In light of this pattern of intellec-
tual property law of not always being in step with technology, it
is unlikely that the Chip Act will entirely avoid this hazard.
The rapid pace of technological change, coupled with the sensi-
tivity of the domestic firms to the resultant changes in costs
and revenues, reinforces this concern.
From this perspective, the industry adherence to the prac-
tice of reverse engineering, as reflected in the hearings on the
Chip Act, has produced a statutory scheme of protection which
may be inextricably linked to the state of the art in the indus-
try at that point in time and technology. Congress showed
some awareness of the problem in its expanded definition of a
mask work as "a series of related images, however fxed or en-
coded."1 7 The legislative history corroborates this sensitivity
to the effect of changing technology on statutory definitions.118
114. Recent studies of this dynamic industry have produced a basis for such
speculation. See, e.g., T. MAHON, CHARGED BODIES 279-303 (1985); J. K. PAUL,
HIGH TECHNOLOGY, INTERNATIONAL TRADE, AND COMPETITION 218-45 (1984).
115. M. Borrus, supra note 98, at Table I.
116. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982) does not expressly list computer programs,
but the legislative history suggests that they can be protected as literary
works. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54, reprinted in 1976 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5667. Congress then provided a status quo pro-
vision, pending a report on the matter by the National Commission on New
Technological Uses (CONTU). Congress adopted that report by amending sec-
tion 117 of the Copyright Act in 1980. See Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2565
(codified at 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1982)). This provision implies that computer pro-
grams are copyrightable. See also Rosen, A Common Law for the Ages of Intel-
lectual Property, 38 U. MIAMI L. REV. 769, 793-804 (1984).
117. 17 U.S.C. § 901(a)(2) (Supp II 1984) (emphasis added).
118. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 35, at 20, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 5769.
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But even as the Chip Act was being signed into law, competi-
tion and technology were working major changes in the struc-
ture and behavior of the domestic semiconductor chip industry.
These forces are proceeding apace, and the results are becom-
ing visible.
One recent study of the international semiconductor chip
industry shows that in 1978, United States firms occupied five
of the top ten industry rankings by volume of sales. In that
year, the Japanese firms ranked third, seventh, and eighth re-
spectively. By 1984, the Japanese firms had moved into the sec-
ond, fourth, fifth, and seventh places. 119 These statistics do not
adequately depict the intense marketing rivalry that produced
these changes. For example, the domestic industry had pio-
neered the standard random access memory (RAM) chip, which
became a staple product of the industry by serving as the oper-
ating basis for a variety of consumer products from personal
computers to video cassette recorders. By copying this chip
product, the Japanese competitors were able to enter the
United States market without incurring the design and market-
ing costs. Given the superior quality control of the Japanese
firms, they were able to offer a better product at a lower price.
An increased market share and a higher ranking in the indus-
try statistics followed. 20
The fate of the RAM chip, once the staple product of the
domestic industry, is an example of the rapid rate of change in
the industry. In-the early 1980's, this chip both underwent im-
provement due to intense research and development efforts and
served as a significant revenue producer. By the third quarter
of 1985, however, the major domestic producers had abandoned
production of the RAM chip to their Japanese competitors.121
At the end of October 1985, Intel Corporation, an industry
leader, announced it was ending its production of the RAM
chip after a third quarter loss of $4 million.122 Mostek Corpora-
tion ceased production after a third quarter loss of $45.6 mil-
lion;123 Motorola is no longer manufacturing the 64k RAM,
having sustained a third quarter loss of $39 million; National
Semiconductor, after a reported loss for the period of $53.5 mil-
119. M. Borrus, supra note 98.
120. 1983 Senate Hearings, supra note 30, at 82 (testimony of F. Thomas
Dunlap, Jr., Corporate Counsel and Secretary, Intel Corp).
121. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1985, at 33, col. 4.
122. See id.
123. See id.
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lion,12 4 has also suspended RAM manufacture. The largest firm
in the industry, Texas Instruments, has announced significant
reductions in personnel and manufacturing, while reporting a
loss of $82.8 million.125
These changes may well diminish the role of the Chip Act.
It may be that the enactment of the statute came too late to
blunt the impact of Japanese competition on domestic produ-
cers. Moreover, the consensus and acceptance of reverse engi-
neering as the norm of industry research and development may
evaporate under the force of technology. In a recent report,
LSI Logic Corporation, a smaller domestic firm, is described as
successfully pioneering the manufacture of small batches of
chips customized to the needs of each user.126 This process of
producing application specific integrated circuits is seen by in-
dustry analysts as causing a major shift in the semiconductor
business. The techniques of producing customized chips permit
the basic logic elements of the chip to be manufactured subject
to being specially crafted to the needs of a particular customer
in the later stages of production. Technological advances since
the passage of the Chip Act allow some chips to be completely
customized by a computer.127 As part of this process of custom-
izing chips, LSI has established its own design centers in major
cities of the world. Customer and manufacturer participate in
the design process. 128
If the present trend in marketing and design changes con-
tinues, reverse engineering may well become obsolete. As com-
petitive forces drive the various firms to adopt diverging and
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. At a time when most semiconductor companies are suffering
from losses, layoffs and plant closings, the LSI Logic Corporation...
has passed $100 million in sales this year and remains one of the few
profitable chip makers in Silicon Valley.
LSI accomplished this feat by surging to the lead in a still small
but rapidly growing segment of the semiconductor business -the pro-
duction of relatively small batches of microelectronic chips that are
customized for each user.
N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1985, at 25, col. 4.
127. LSI specialized in one technique of producing customized chips.
In this technique, known as gate arrays, the basic logic elements, or
"gates," are laid out on a chip and then customized by connecting
them in a certain order in the last stages of production.
Analysts say a key to LSI's success is that it provides excellent
software allowing customers to do their own chip designs or go to [SI
design centers around the world.
N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1985, at 45, col. 2.
128. Id.
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complex technologies in the quest for market shares, reverse
engineering becomes more expensive. The custom products of
one manufacturer may be very difficult and costly to analyze.
Moreover, as firms develop different chips for different users,
the chip of one manufacturer may have no appeal to the clien-
tele of a competitor.
As the domestic industry shifts away from standardized
products made under a relatively uniform technology, reverse
engineering, which served as the arbiter of protection under
the earlier technology, declines in significance. If this percep-
tion is valid, there are at least two foreseeable results. One is
that the Chip Act, perhaps developed too late to shield the do-
mestic producers from the Japanese capture of the RAM mar-
ket, may serve in a diminished role in the market that remains.
The second result is that infringement actions will arise be-
tween domestic firms employing widely divergent technologies.
In these cases, courts will face difficult tasks of interpretation.
As its contribution to the law of intellectual property, the Chip
Act may have allowed for the acceptance of some copying, in
the copyright sense, as a legitimate ingredient of competition.
The fact of its enactment as a sui generis statute for this dy-
namic industry will surely have enriched this sometimes musty
area of the law.
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